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IBSTR1CT
Thepaper extends the recent literature on collapsing imnaced
exchangerate regines by allowing explicitly for the qovernnent bndget
constraint and the interest cost of servicing the public debt. The
policy experivent that isanalysedis thedecisionby a ciovernnent to
replenish its stock offoreignexchange reserve throxrhaonce—off open
narket saleofbonds.Withoutafundanental fiscalcorrection (ie. a
decisionto reducethe prinary(non-interesti deficit by ananuunt equal
totheincreaseinthe interestcost of servicing thedebt) the
conseqincesare as follows. In adeterministicnndelthetimingof
thespeculativeattack is brought Iorwsrd(delayed) ifthe borrowing
takes place long before(closeto thedate atubich withoutborrowing
thecollapseuld have occurrecLThe naqnitnde of the attack(the
finalloss of reserves) aiwsys increasesbecauseofborrowing. Ina
stochastic nodel, borrowing reducestheprobability ofan earlycollapse
and increases thelikelihoodof a latercollapseUnder mild








Thepurpose of thispaperis to extend the recent literature on
coliapsingranaged exchange ratereqis by allowing explicitly for the
ciouernirentbudgetconstraintandespecially fortheinterestcost of
seriicing the public debtThe seminalpaperof Salant and Henderson
11978]analysedthe ialications of governuent attenpts to peq the price
of gold or to defend a price ceiling by mnagingastockpile; it
denonstrated theinevitabilityof an eventual speculative attack and o
thecollapseof suchschenes. Rrrinn [1979]provided thefirst
application of this analytical approach to the acroeconomicproblemof
defending a fixed exchange rate parity. Since thentherehave beeniiny
other1nxtinly theoretical1 studies of the viability ofavariety of
ianaqed exchange rate reqines and of thenature andlikelihood of
speculative attacks. [See e.g. Floodand Garber [l983 1984a1h11
Obstfeld [1984a1 b, c}, Connolly and Taylor [1984] and Dornbusch
[19811]).Relatedrelevanttheoretical grk on speculative attacks1
runs1 etc. canbefound in Salant 119831 ''iiich analyses price
stabilization schenes andDianrndandDybviq11983] thich deals with
bank runs. Enuirical urk in this tradition is still relatively scarce1
but notableexauplesare Ctnthy and vanWijnberen [198311Grilli 119841
1986b1. Collins [1984] andGarber and Grilli[1986L
The existing literature aintist invariably treats donestic credit
expansion(dce) as the exogenous ciovernnentcontrol and fundanental
forcingvariable driving thestock of reserves andlortheexchange rate
(One notable exception is Cunbyand van I4ijnberqen [1983]).This paper2
"goes behind" doe and considers separatelytheprirynon—interest)
ciouernaentdeficit the interest cost of seruicinci the public debt and
thenet issues ofinterest—bearing qavernsent debts By doing this, the
otherwiseinplicit fiscaland financial aspectsofdecisions to alter
the1e,eland/artherateof growthofthe stock a dostic credit are
brought out explicitly. While this is a rthkiile exercise in its oxi
right, it is especially useful 'kien as in Garber and il1i [19861 and
Cil1i [1986b}. the consequences for the likelihood and timing of a
specu1atie attack on the exchange rate of a crouernirent decision to
borrow (internationally) to augnent its stock of reser'es is analyseth
In Sections 21and3)Ianalyse the consequences of a decision by
the go'ernnent to replenish its stockof foreignexchange reseres
through a once-off,, stock-shift open nerket sale of bondsWithout a
fundanental fiscal correction (i.e a decision to cut the prirrary
deficit by an annunt equal to the increase in the interest cost of
seruicing the debt), the consequences of this decision to borrow f or the
timing arid nngnitude of the speculatiue attack that causes the collapse
of the fixed exchange rate reciine are as follows.In the deterministic
continuoustine rrndel of Section 2), thetiming of the speculatiue
attackis brought £orntrd if theborrowingtakesplace sufficientlylong
beforethe dateat s.kiich the collapse uld haue occurredabsent the
borrowing. It is delayed ifthe borrowing takes place sufficiently
closeto the collapsedate without borrowing, The negnitude of the
attack (neasured by the size of the final stock-shift reduction in the
stock of reserues to their critical leuel) alsniys increases asa result3
oftheborrowing.In the stochastic discretetii nde1 of Section 3)
theprobabilityof collapse kperiods orless after the borrowinqfalls
for sn1l k and increases for large k. 1s in the deterministic case
this reflects the fact that because of theinterestcost of ser'icinq
thenewly incurred debtan act of borrowinq redes thelevel of the
stockofdcrnEstic credit (increases thelevelof the stockof reserves)
butalsoincreasestherate of dowesticcredit expansion (increases the
rateat cthich the stock of reserves declines).Finally4 under mild
conditions4 the expected leniithof thetineintervaluntilthecollapse
isincreasedbyan act of borrowinq.
2 (vernnnt Borrowing andtheTiming and !tgnitudeof Speculative
£kttacks;The Continius Ti Deterministic Case.
The sinple contintus tiiiedeterministic sumli country open economj
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Fl is the nominal stockof non-interest-bearingdostic
hiqh-porecE nnney,i thedoimstic nominal interestrate ydonstic
real output, P the dostic price level,P theforeicin price level, S
the spot nominalexchanqe rate, i theforeign nominal interest rate, 8*
the stockof qovernnnt debt,thestockofofficial foreign exchange
reserves and ithenominal prineryi.e. netof interest on the public
debt, deficit.
Pi and y areexogenous.Thereis a single traded goodand
strictpurchasingpor parity(F.F.P.) holds (equation 2).There isa
perfect international financial nBrket with risk-neutral speculators.
The doiiestic nominal interest rate is therefore given by the uncovered
interest parity condition (3).Etdenotes the expectation operator
conditionaloninfornmtion available at tiire t.(4) denotes the open
econom,r consolidated governnmnt sector budget identity. ill qovernnt
borrowing is assuired to be denominated in foreign currency. This is for
convenience only. The paper is not concernedwith theuse of
(unexpected devaluationas a umansof reducing the real val of the
authorities interest-bearing debt. For that iss the currency
denomination of the debt is of course crucial. Isss of political or
sovereign risk are also ignored. is the current vali of public
sector "exhaustive" spending on goods and services minus taxes net of
transfers, excluding interest on the debt, i*SB*.
Using the nDnetary authoritys balance sheet identity ;can
reinterpret(4) as the familiar condition that the governnent deficit




crucial assunpt ionis that theinterestrate paid on govermnt
debt,1* > o,exceedsthe interestrate oninternational reserves r*.
Given that assthiption, the further assun)tic)n nde inthis paper thatr*
=o,only serves to sinpiify the algebra. If the tinterest rates
reequal there vuld, even in an onlyw1ininel ly rational lii,never
be any foreign exchange crises (or liquiditycrises) ich re notalso
governn-entsolvency or i sesThe solvency constra int of thegouernxent
is given in equation 5). It is obtained by integrating the governnnt







1Thiscondition is iina S(u)IE*(u)R*{u)I=0.eee.g.
U— C. J
Eluiter[1985].6
Eajuation3)statesthat the value of the qovernints net
non—urietarydebt shouldnot exceedthe present vaiue of future excted
prinerysurpluses —v plus thepresentvalueof future expected
seignioraqerevenue 11(u) minus the present value of the eKpected futLece
- M ** costof holdingreserves(i (v)—r (u))S(u)R (v). Clearlyifi =r
theopportunity cost of holdingreserves is aero, 1 successfulopen
* *_ - nerketsale by the gouerrin-nt (equal increases in B (t) arid R (ti) thich
raise the future expected path of thestock ofreserves (E+5R*(u)
for all u t)2willnot, inthatcase, affect thesolvency of the
*
gouernnentthe r .hof(5) is unaffected by it.Il, hcver,
then borrowing toreplenish the stockof reserves willrsen the
gouerrment's solvencyposition.If (5)holdswith strictequality,then
either futureprinery surpluses niistberaised, or futureseigniorage
** revenuesist oc 000st ectinorder to ave IUi necwency.3itn1=r,any
sensible governnerit uldraise both B*arid R* to arbitrarily high
levels, thus eliminatinq the risk of running out of reserves,without
** tnisin any y affecting theirsolvency. 1)r 15thereforea
necessary conditionfor there tobe a reserve problem separate from a
soly problem. Withi r*,debt repudiationor default uld
**
acconpanyany foreign exchange crisis. The assunptiorA that i> r is
historically appropriate for the gold standard reqie analysed by Gerber
£Note 5(v)5 fort ere t is the date ofcollapseand R'(v)
t. i(v) andr(u),u < t areunaffected by the cpensarket SCIC.
£ successful opennerketsaleraises t.7
and Grilli [.1985] and Grilli [I986bj. In a sterling—dollar trld, with
a fixed dollar price of gold and a fixed sterling price of qoid r =a
thi1e sterling and dollar short neminal interest rates re positive.
Wherenixiern financial deuelopnEnt s haue great lyreduced or even
eliminated the financialopportunitycost of holdingreserves the
analysisof this paper hastobe qualifiedsince inthe limitas rN
goes toi foreignexchangecrisis is nerelyonenanifestation of a
so1",erycrisis.
Initiallythe econcnw is on a fixed exchange ratewithS =SWhen
the stock of reserves falls below a threshold level 11* the authorities
stop defending the exchange rate and a free float of indefinite duration
ensis. Otherscenarioshave beenanalysed(e.g. by (Jbstfeld [1984b1)
but forourpurposesthesinplest case suffices. The threshold level is
setequal to zero. Following the new familiarargunentthatefficient
financial nnrkets rule out anticipated futurediscreteor discontinuous
changes in the level of the exchange rate cancalculatethe date
t =tat 'irkich the fixed exchange rate reqine collapses and a free float
begins from the boundaryconditionthat at t the exchane ratethat
wuld prevail iftheexchange rate collapsed and floated at t S(t)3
equals the fixed exchange rate SThe exauple is chosen suoh that
reserves are lost continuously and a collapse in finite tine is certain.
Grilli [1986a] analyses a unre svnietric snll country ndel for thich
in addition to theloerbound on reserves (ktich ien crossedconpelsa
floator a devaluation) there also is an upperbound ('iIiich viencrossed
convels a £bat or a revaluation .Inatu—country node I the saneB
results could be obtained with each national authority estab1ishiria
lorboundforits stock of reser*ies.
In the exasple. hen the fixed exchange rate regimscollapses!the
expected proportional rate of exohanqe rate depreciation becomss
positi"e The domsatic nominal interest rate therefore increases
discretely at t and there is a discrete {"stock—shift"]reduction in the
dennnd for real nnney balances. With SIt) given at S (because of the
required continuity of the exchanqe rate) the reduction in the real
nrneystockis brouqhtabout bya reduct ion in the nominal nnrey stock
Thestock-shift reduction in theannoy stock5M1t) is brought about bya
speculative attack at tin kiich the stock of reserves undergoes a
stock—shift reduction to its critical level. Thetotal stock of
domssticclaims on the rest of the nrld cannot of course change at a
point in tims (barrinq repiiiation. The stock-shift loss of reserves
by the authorities is therefore mstched by doirestic pri'ate agents
acquiring interest-bearing claims on the rest of the rld.
The literature has traditionally treated domsstic credit expansion
I) as the fundaserital (exogenous; foroing uariable. 4hile ther-e is
nothing logically rong with such a specification! it suppresses and
therefore tends to obscure thefiscaland debt unriageneat aspects of
exchange rate reqiire uiability andhreakdon.The inportance of this
issue is greatest ken the policy euent under consideration is a
financial operation of theqouernwent.in exanpie of such an euent is
contained in wistiilatiagpapers by Gerberand Grilli[19861 and
Grilli [1386bj on theelnnnt—rbrganSyndicate bond issue and its role9
in defendmq the ciold standard in i895 3rief lv their arqunt is that
AentheUS Treasury horrod abroad through the Syndicate to
replenish its stock of cold reser1.e this act of borrowinQ increased
the uiability of the cold standard in the sense thatit reduced
teiiformlv the probabilityof collapse after the loan s secured
conparedto it*atc•uldhave been the case without the loanS
Theanalysis of this section and of the next deironstrates that the
Garber-Grilliarguunt inplicitly assunesthatthe act of borrowinct s
a000nbanied by a fiscal correction specifically by a reduction in the
prinerydeficit 1iich kept doe after the borrowinq on thepath ituld
hauebeen one without the borrowingWithout such a I inca 1 correct ion
the needto service the additional debt requires either increased
donestic credit expansion or further borrowinq1 there exists an
upperbound on the stock ofinterest-bearing debt a qovernnentisable
or wi 11 mg tocountenanceincreased borrowing now neans increased
don-esticcredit expansion later and thereforeincreased loss of reserves
and a greater probability ofcollapse later Thisargunent is ofcourse
sinpiy an open economy extension ofSarpentand Wallaces "Unpleasant
tnetaristfrithnetic
For sinplicity I consider the caseinwhich theauthoritiesengage
in oneactof borrowinq at t =tit that date there is a
assuwethroughout thatthe long run real interest rate exceedsthe
longrungrowth rateof the real tax base, to rule out feasible Ponzi
ganeslQ
stock—shift once-off open nrket sale of bonds..Giueriperfect capital
nubility, it is iimterial ckether uisualiz.e the qo,ernnnt as
borrawinq at honeorborrowinq abroad. The net effect at t is a
stock-shift reduction in the stock of donestic credit andanequal
increase in the stock of reser'es andinthe stock of interest—bearinci
public debt..
after the open nerket sale, no further borrowinqoccurs.. Thisney
well be an acceptable stylistic representation of thesituationin the
late l89ø s cen gouernnent debt issues re uery nvch theexception to
the rule..It uy also describe the situation of a nuther of deuelopinq
andsemi-industrializedeconomies that are faced with an external credit
constraint and aregiuenthe option of a once—off relaxation of that
constraint.. Because of the higher debt seruice conponent in thepublic
sector deficit therateof donestic credit expansion will behigher
after tthanituld haue been without the borrowinq4 if the prinary - - -
deficitpath is unaffected by the borrowing.. The authorities
effectively purchase a once-off reduction in the stock of donestic
credit at t for a pern-E&nentiy higher rate of donestic credit expansion
after t. Equiialently they obtain a once-off increase in the stock of
reser'es at t for a hiqher rate of reduction in the stock of reser,es 0 -
—4 aftert anduntilthefixed exchanqerepine collapses at t =t..
0 -
itse1fas show-i below, will be affected by the open narket sale..11
Inthecontinnousti1 deterministic irodelof this section the
effect oftheopen nmrket saleon thetimingof thecollapseis
aithigxusIftheborrowingoccurs,ustbeforethe exchange rate regiui
1Duldha''ecollapsed absent the borrowing, the collapse is postponed (t
increases)If the borrowing occurs long enoiih before the exchange
rate regine vuld hac'e collapsed in the absence of borrowings the
collapseis broughtF orrd (t declines). In the latter case the higher
rateof declineofreserues dominates theonce—off increasein the le"el
of thestock of reserues inthe F orner case theopposite holds.
Inthediscretetine stochasticnodelof Section 3theprobability
at t of collapse in or before periodt +i=l2fallsas a 0 - 0
- -
resultof borrowingatt for snaIl jibutrises for large i.The 0
- -
intuitionagain is strong a stochastic 'ersion of liue nowand pay
later.For an act of borrowingtolover uniformly theprobabilityof
collapse it n-txst be acconpaniedbya fiscal correction! i.e. by a
rethxtion in the prinary deficit.
slong as the fixed exchange rate regine sr;iues the beha'iour
of the stock of reser'es except at those instants that the nonetary
authorities engage in open narket operations is giuen by
SR =—+i*SB*)++ SB
+pey + —N,the determinantsof the growth in
denand for unney balances.In order to ass'e that theexchange ratereqine is headedfor
collapse it is assunedthat L +i*SB*-> ® Sinceonlyone
stock—shiftopenwarketsale of bonds at t is considered, =for-
all t ) t. Donesticcreditexpansion therefore exceedsthe growthof'
tney dewand and a collapse is certain. iat remains to be determined
isthetimingand themaqnitude of the speculative attack that forces
the abandorment ofthefixedexchange rate regirie andthe way inwhich
bothtiming and magnitude are affected by borrowing without a
fundanental fiscal correction.
first calculate the shadow floating exchangerateat tine
t, 5(t),i.e. what theexchangerate'zuld be at t if it floatedfreely
for allfuture tima withat its criticalvaluezero, i.e. with M =D.
£linearapproximationof thenodel gives us theequationof notion
for theexpected exchange rate














The shadow floating rateis the'presentdiscounted 'alue"of
futureexpected fundanntals. The fundanntals are futureexpected
nry stocks(or stocks of dowestic credit)and the future expected
determinantsof noneydemand z(.).i.e. the future Loreicin price le'el
thefuture£oreiqn interest rate andfuture real output.
Thefixed exchangeratereqinewillcollapse and a free float will
coimeneeatt =, ifand only i £
8)5(t) =5
Let theforeigninterest rate i and theprimarygoernmant deficit
i.beconstant o"er tima, i.e.
5We choosethe unique continuouslyco;ergent solution.14
3*—*




fltt there is a stock—shift open nrket purchase ar1thereafterB is
0 - -
keptconstant.
From(7) (8 and(9)s findthat
taI - + *5*(, )]
1015 =IDle )++ iSB(tlilt—t÷ °
I







ignore as of secondorderaqnitude, theeffectof changesinthe
e}{c-hangerateon debt ser-ice SinceS isendoqenousfroiit on D(t)
' QiuenbyD(t) =D(t)++ i3*SB(t))(t -t)
+iB (t) (5(u) —S)thi
L?J
C15
The interual beteenthe openmarket purchaseand the dateof'
collapseis thereforegi.ienby:
S -—D(t)-Z(t) 0
The openmarketsale reducesD(t)by thesaneanDuntitincreases
SB*andSR.The effect of theborrowing anthe timingofthecollapse









6dB*(t )= —dD(t) 0
12) t—t =0
I




















Thefirst term on the right handsideof 1i3)neasesthe
beneficial effect of hauinqalo'ir,er stock of danestic credit and
acquirinci a larger stock of reserues at t. It obiiously postponesthe
day of collapse. The secondtermrepresents the effectoftheincreased
rate of doiiestic credit expansion after t0 di to theincreased debt
seruice! It brings forard the day of collapse.
hssuming,as'—_dothat6 + i*SB> 0 and i > 0 theconditionfor







Thus thenBthemtics bearsoutthe intuitionthatifreserues are
replenished by an open nrket sale just before the regine ould haue
collapsed, the date of collapse is postponed.Ifthe repIenishnnt
takes place farenoughin aduanceofthe collapse date without
replenishnent,the date of'collapseis actually brought forrd.
Fig'e I illustrates thetinepaths of the stack of reserves with
andwithoutborrowing at t. Clearly, the open nerket sale tilts the
8Notethat S--
D(t0)
—Z(t)> 0 if t > t, hich is a necessary
assuntion to haveaninteresting problem.17
reserve path it shifts it up vertically by ö R*(t) at tand
increases the steepness of thenegativelysloped path after t. t is
the date of collapse without borrowing at to and R*(t_)the stock of
reservesthe instant beforethespeculative attack at t.
Fiqure Iarepresents the case r.èieret —tincreases as a result of — 0
gouernnntborrowinq at t and Fiqurelbthecaseere theattack is
brouqht I or'mrd.
Toconlete the pictTwe'nustdetermine'thathappens to the stock
ofreserves at t, just before thecollapse1as a result of the open
narket saleThe ansriskno.n once know 'hat happens tothe
ncminal interest rate at t4t t1 i(t) =iwith or without
-- _
borrowing.tt, i(t) =i'+E,Ifthe proportional rate of
t 3(t)
exchange rate depreciation S/S is higher (1or) at t with borrowing at
t thanwithoutit, thenthestockof reserves at t_ (andthe collapse
tozero of the stock of reserves at t) will be larger (snaller) with




Since S(t =S.the proportional rate of exchange rate depreciation at
the nDint of collapse is raised by borrowing at t reqardless of
ether the collapse is postponed or brought forward. Borrowing at toIS
thereforeincreases the neqnitnde of thespeculative attackas ifeasured
bythestock-shiftloss of reserves at t.
For a cowtry headedtoards anunnted devaluation4 theanalysis
hasthe followinginvlications. First1 don't borrow toosoon for
without anyreductionin the prinery deficit4 tooearlyborrowinq ney
precipitate thecollapse.Secondslastminute" borrowing to defendthe
exohanqe rateis useful if thetineit buysisusedtoinrdenent a
superior fundanental fiscal correction4 i.e. a nure effective package of'
neasures for reducingtheprinery deficit.
3.CverrrnentBorrowing and the Timing ofa Speculative Attack;
TheDiscrete Tine Stochastic Case.
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19) Nt÷l) —Fitt)+StHB(t+l) —Bt)j —StHRt+l) —H(t)ls S1.1.
+i*(t)S(t)B*(t)19
usbefore.t is theperiod durinq ichan opennerketpurchaseis
perforned. The probability1 at t that thefixed exchancie ratereciine
collapses in periodt} t (neitherlaterrr earlier) is deneted
zi(t,t). £ks before S(t) is theshadowfloatingexchange ratei.e.
the exchangerate thatw,uldpre'ailattiretif thefixedexchanqe
rateregincollapsed atthatinstant. Therefore
(20) n(t t) a Prob, 6(t)S and S(t—i) < Sz I i
tt0J
II (t,t) is theprobability,at t, thatthe exchange rate
regine will collapse no later thanperiod t.I shall use thefactthat,
for theshadowexchangerateforcing processspecified below,(21)
he ids20
t
(21) 1(tt) z\ n(j, t) =Prcbt (9(t) ￿)
j=t-f-ia
Linearizing the nudel of equations(16)to (19) .obtainthe
following first order equation of nrition for the shadow exchange rate
22)9(t) =aE S(t+l) +aD(t) +
9mesecond equality in (21) only holds because the shadow exchange rate
in ow node! alys depreciates.
Take e.q. the t-periood horizon1 i.e theprobabilitythatthe fixed
exchange rate reginocollapsesin no sore thantperiods.
It +2tnIt +1t I+(t +2t to o' '00' 0 0
=Frob4fS(t +1) ) +Prob1s(t...+2)1
'at0 j
- Prob6(t ÷1) ) S and S(t +2) } SI
t-o a 0
Butsince6(t)is strictly increasing in t (seeequation(26) below)
ProhtS(t+l) ) S andB(t+2)> Sj =Prob15t÷1)
>
r










23b)a ;a )o Th +i)p
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154ç'N I
£Jc)utj = _ p(t) +






ChoosingthefundanEntalfconuergent forrd—1ooking solution for
9(t);-find
-. Vii I 24 6(t) =aD(t)+utj+;a Etla Dft +k)+(t+k)
k= I
t+k— 1
I'ktethatD(t += D(t)+It+k—t)iB3(t) +z(j)
Following Flood and Garber [1984] —_assusthat L(j) is gouerned
bythe following stochastic process.22
25a' = +
25b)E(j)=-)H+r(J)
The r?L11arei.id. randomiariables withan exponentialdensity£
gi'Jen by





Thisspecificationensures thatdowesticcredit expansion, although
stochastic, is alys positi'e.Note that since arbitrarilylarge
realizations of rjcan occur, thereis alys a non-zeroprobabilitythat
any stockofreserues, houer- large, will be exhaustedbya speculatiuc
attack thenext period.Lis pointed out by Flood andGarber [l984]the
currency willtherefore al.eys standata I or'.erd discount hiie the
fixed exchange rate regisuruiues.
ssurningfornotational sinlicity that u(t) =Eu(t+k)0 for
all t forall k 1, can now reite (24)as
a
26 Sit) =—— IDIt +It—t)(i*SBIt )+—X +
















— ID(to)+ (t— t)(i+ iSB*(t)— x')J
Sire the(j)•i=t0 t-1 areindependentrandan 'ariableseach
ha;inganexporntial distribution with paranter X1 it fo1iov that













Using e1eintaryproperties of gaim functions this sinlifies to
301 I{tt) —
1
(xx(tt))k—)K(t,t )K(t,t) ) 0
K(tt) ￿ 0
The case considered by Flood aridGarber [1984] in'ol"edthe
probabilityof collapse theneat periodsI {t0 + 1,t0} ich from
(30) is giuen by
—XK(t +1,t
















(t,t) increases with t i5e5 (t +1,t0) > jJ(t,t).
First holdingthe iPs constant,increasing t by oneperiod addsa
positi.'etermto thesum in(30i Secondfrom(28b) K(t1t) decreases
orstays constant (accordi as to IetherI.+ i*SB*(t)- 0)as
aij(tt0)
t increase fls shc below in equation (31), = - t-' 0
0 iny decline in K(t,t0) ast25
We now considerhowi for K(tt) 3 theprobabilityof collapse
&uingan inter,alof t —tperiods after an opensrketsale at t is























Noting that since a ,thisdiscretetine stochastic
14- T-.— .4-.-- .— .4 .— 1 I 4-.— .,.-, + ,—4- - EI.J. coa pon .
deterministicresult reported in equation (l4)
k26
Clearlytheprobabilityof an ixiidiate collapse after an open






flso,from (33)theduration of theinter;al,after an open iiarket
sale, for iiich the probability of a collapse is reduced is inerseiy
related to the interest rate.
It xuld be inforntiue to obtain an expression for theexpected
durationof the interual beten theopennerket sale and the collapse
of thefixed exchange rateregi1,and toanalyse howitis affected by
thesale.The expected iting tin until thecollapseis denoted
E4 (t —t).
I- 0 0
Theprobability of a collapse occurringin periodt (neither
earliernorlater)is rr(t,t) =I(t,t)— (t—I,t)
Therefore,
- V -
34)E(t —t)=)(t —t) (t,t) — ft—it)
t=t +10
- -
Notethat I1 ft t )= 0for k ;'. 00-27











t—t —1—XKt +11 t (AK(+1, tj) 0 0 0
= lt—t) e o t—t —1)!
t=t+1 0
n
(XK(t+ 1 t ))ttl XJ(t +e ) 0 0 0 0isa Poisson density with
(t —t —I)! 0
paraterXK(t +1t ).Itsnean is XK(t +It )Therefore 0 0 0 0
-Xx
(XC a /a
Usingthe factthat if a
C)XO





36)E. (t —t)= XRtt+lt +I
t- 0 0 o






nopen irketsaleat t nreases the eLmeoted lenqthof'the 0 -
interualuntil the collapse of the eHohange rate regiii.f.f
i(1—a.This is thesa(ak) condition underihich
(t +lt) falls as a result of theopenrket sale see
equation (34)
Conclusion
Theinresults of thepaper aresumrizod in theintroductionS
I conclude by restatinq the in policy conclusion andsugqestinq
possibleeHtenslons of the approachadoptedin thispapers
The policy ssane ofthepaperis a familiar hut inportant one
rrowinq additional resers todefend the exchangerateis useful to
theextentthat"buyinq tine"is usefuL Itmight egbeuseful ifthe
qualityof the fiscalpackagenecessary tocreate a uiableexchange rate
reqineis inproued by a delayin its inpleentation rrowing without
afiscal correction lors the likelihoodof' anearly collapse and
increasesthe expected duration of theinterualuntil the collapse As29
it raises the likelihoodofa later collapses .iiability (in thesenseof
lenarrnasswed sw-,i',al of theunaqed exchance ratereqinel can be
achie',ed only by lov.erinq theqo,errrnent'sneed for seiqrTiioraqe re''en
Thisrequires afundanental fiscal correction4 i.e. a loring of the
prinry deficit.
Desirable extensions of theanalyticalapproach of this paper
includea nnreflexible specification of fiscal and financialpolicyand
a irore satisfactory sodellinq of liquidity constraints4 leading to
£oreiqn exchanqe crises andthe collapseof nenaqedexchancre rate
reqines4andsoh'encv constraints causinanot onlyforeign exchange
crises but also default on or repudiation of public sector debt.12 1n
international cash—in-athiance nDdelnaybe a suitable ,ehicle for
analysing both issues.
1For an interestinq discussion of son of these issues see Obstfeld
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Borrowing and the Timing and Magnitude of the Collapse of
A Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
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